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Hard Choices: Where To Draw the Line on 
Limiting Selection in the Selective Reduction of 
Multifetal Pregnancies 
Mary A. Scott* 
Imagine a hopeful mother, desperate after many failed at-
tempts to become pregnant. She consults a fertility clinic and 
decides to undergo the invasive and costly process of in vitro 
fertilization (IVF). The procedure is more than successful—she 
finds herself pregnant with quadruplets. At less than five feet 
tall and with a petite frame, she will not be able to carry all 
four fetuses to term. Her doctor recommends an abortion, but 
she is unwilling to sacrifice the pregnancy. In 1984, such a pa-
tient came to Mark Evans, an obstetrician-geneticist who per-
formed the first procedure now known as selective reduction—
the termination of one or more fetuses in a multifetal pregnan-
cy.1 
As reproductive technology has become more accessible in 
recent years, the number of multifetal pregnancies has sky-
rocketed.2 Due to the risks inherent in multifetal pregnancies,3 
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siasm and invaluable guidance on this topic; to the Minnesota Law Review edi-
tors and staff for their helpful guidance and edits, particularly to Laura Far-
ley, Rebecca Furdek, Ian Jackson, and Seungwon Chung; to the various 
teachers and mentors throughout my life who have encouraged me to continu-
ously challenge my own perspective; and most importantly, to my family, for 
their encouragement, trust, and unconditional love and support. Copyright © 
2016 by Mary A. Scott. 
 1. Liza Mundy, Too Much To Carry?, WASH. POST (May 20, 2007), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051501 
730.html. 
 2. E.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, 
Committee Opinion No. 553: Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction, 121 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 405, 406 (2013) [hereinafter Committee Opinion No. 553] (not-
ing that the birthrate of twins increased 76% between 1980 and 2009 and the 
birthrate of triplets increased 400% between 1980 and 1998). 
 3. See id. (noting the risks of prematurity, cerebral palsy, learning disa-
bilities, slow language development, behavioral difficulties, chronic lung dis-
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the practice of selective reduction has progressed as the num-
bers of such pregnancies has increased.4 These trends mean 
that when fertility treatment is involved, patients and physi-
cians often find themselves in the difficult position of having to 
choose which fetus or fetuses to keep. Physicians may select 
which fetus to terminate based on proximity to the maternal 
abdominal wall.5 In other cases, physicians may consider other 
factors including apparent abnormalities, other findings affect-
ing health of a particular fetus, or the parents’ desire to have a 
child of a particular sex.6 
As assisted reproduction practices are evolving, so too is 
the regulation of reproductive rights in the United States. As of 
2015, several states have expanded abortion regulation by en-
acting laws specifically banning abortions based on the wom-
an’s motivation for seeking an abortion.7 While most of these 
laws target abortions based on the sex of the fetus, an increas-
ing number of states have recently either proposed or passed 
laws prohibiting abortions based on the presence of a genetic 
abnormality such as Down syndrome.8 At least one state pro-
hibited abortions based on the race of the fetus or a parent of 
the fetus.9 There is currently no parallel federal regulation, alt-
hough it has been attempted.10 Such state laws have been chal-
lenged as unconstitutional, but the debate is not yet resolved.11 
 
ease, developmental delay, and death to infants as well as health and econom-
ic risks to mothers). 
 4. See Mundy, supra note 1. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists distinguishes between selective reduction and multifetal preg-
nancy reduction: “[i]n multifetal pregnancy reduction, the fetus(es) to be re-
duced are chosen on the basis of technical considerations, such as which is 
most accessible to intervention. In selective reduction, fetuses are chosen on 
the basis of health status or sex.” Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2, at 
408–09. This Note consistently uses “selective reduction” to refer to both 
meanings. 
 5. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy: 
Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 781 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Daar, Lifeboat Ethics]. 
 6. See Mark I. Evans, The Truth About Multiple Births, NEWSWEEK, 
Mar. 2, 2009, at 14. 
 7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 510/6 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2011). 
 8. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013); S.B. 334, 119th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 
2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016). 
 9. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02. 
 10. See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, H.R. 3541, 
112th Cong. (2012). 
 11. After the Arizona law’s passage, the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People, Maricopa County Branch (Maricopa NAACP) 
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While these laws ban selection (based on genetic abnormality, 
sex, or race) specifically in the context of abortions, most do not 
purport to ban such selection practices specifically in the con-
text of selective reduction.12 The assisted reproduction industry 
in general and the practices associated with IVF, including se-
lective reduction, are nearly entirely unregulated.13  
While there is extensive literature examining the ethics of 
selective reduction14 and critiquing the regulation of sex selec-
tion in particular,15 there is currently a gap in research with re-
spect to how motivation-based abortion prohibitions might in-
tersect with the unregulated assisted reproduction industry 
and the practice of selective reduction. This intersection raises 
questions of whether selective reduction falls within the ambit 
of state abortion laws,16 whether motivation-based abortion 
prohibitions could withstand constitutional scrutiny,17 and 
 
and the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) brought 
an equal protection claim asserting that “the Act stigmatizes and denigrates 
their members on the basis of race and gender,” and that the reasons for the 
Act’s passage were based on ill-informed racial stereotypes, discriminating 
against their members and causing stigmatic harm. NAACP v. Horne, No. 
CV13-01079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2013). The 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona determined that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify 
any personal injury suffered by them.” Id. at *6. 
 12. Of the states that have enacted motivation-based abortion prohibi-
tions, North Dakota appears to be the only state to explicitly include “the elim-
ination of one or more unborn children in a multifetal pregnancy” in its defini-
tion of abortion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1. Otherwise, where such laws 
do not explicitly encompass selective reduction, it is arguable that selective 
reduction does not legally constitute abortion. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or 
Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 639 (1997) (“A review of federal and state 
laws pertaining to the practice of reproductive technologies reveals that prac-
titioners in our country enjoy a nearly regulatory-free environment. A single 
inactive federal program and  a handful of state laws comprise the total regula-
tory scheme surrounding [assisted reproductive technologies].”). 
 14. See, e.g., Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2; Daar, Lifeboat 
Ethics, supra note 5, at 822–28. 
 15. Compare, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology 
Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
48–61 (1992) (proposing a possible action plan for regulating sex selection), 
with David McCarthy, Why Sex Selection Should Be Legal, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 
302, 306–07 (2001) (arguing that the major objections to sex selection do not 
provide sufficient grounds to limit reproductive liberties). 
 16. Radhika Rao, Selective Reduction: “A Soft Cover for Hard Choices?” or 
Another Name for Abortion?, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 197 (2015) (arguing 
that selective reduction and abortion “are points along a continuum that 
should not be segregated and analyzed in strict isolation”). 
 17. See Justin Gillette, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of 
Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 645, 649 
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whether there is a different legal framework that would be 
more useful in regulating selection in the context of assisted 
reproduction. Answering these questions is important in light 
of a political climate in which the continued passage of motiva-
tion-based abortion prohibitions and other restrictions on abor-
tion is likely, and the assisted reproduction industry continues 
to progress with little regulation. 
This Note attempts to fill this gap in scholarship by deter-
mining if and to what extent the growing number of motiva-
tion-based abortion prohibitions may apply to selective reduc-
tion. This Note does not engage in the ethical battle over 
whether selective reduction or selective abortions should be 
practiced. Rather, it seeks to make a legal argument about 
whether and how selection should be regulated as a step in the 
selective reduction procedure. Part I investigates the develop-
ment and current standing of motivation-based abortion prohi-
bitions, discusses the current state of regulation in the assisted 
reproduction industry, and introduces the current ethical and 
legal frameworks used to discuss selective reduction. Part II 
shows how motivation-based abortion prohibitions could create 
barriers to women in need of selective reductions by analyzing 
the constitutionality of motivation-based abortion prohibitions, 
determining how selective reduction fits within the abortion 
framework, and investigating how motivation-based abortion 
prohibitions may apply to various selective reduction scenarios. 
Part III argues that motivation-based abortion prohibitions 
should generally not apply in cases of selective reduction and 
proposes that state legislatures amend their abortion laws to 
better protect selective reduction as a necessary procedure. 
Part III then suggests that state legislatures implement report-
ing requirements to encourage effective self-regulation practic-
es in the assisted reproduction industry and that states man-
date that selection be random only in certain narrowly limited 
circumstances. While this Note acknowledges that there may 
be other barriers to selective reduction beyond the scope of this 
proposed solution, it aims to provide an adequate response to 
the most pressing obstacle—the increasing number of motiva-
tion-based abortion prohibitions. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF SEX SELECTION, ABORTION, AND 
 
(2013) (arguing that motivation-based abortion prohibitions cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny); Annie Moskovian, Bans on Sex-Selective Abortions: 
How Far Is Too Far?, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423, 439–44 (2013) (conclud-
ing that sex selection should be constitutionally protected). 
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SELECTIVE REDUCTION   
Sex-selective abortion laws and selective reduction have 
evolved independently and in response to different concerns. 
This independent evolution creates two divergent contexts in 
which selection arises. Whereas recent legislation anticipates 
selection of fetal characteristics as a motive to seek an abortion, 
in the context of selective reduction, selection may arise as an 
option once the decision to reduce has already been made. This 
Part shows the development of selection practices, the passage 
of laws in response to those practices, and recent interpreta-
tions and applications of those laws. This Part also examines 
current regulation of the assisted reproduction industry and 
the ethical and legal frameworks of selective reduction. Specifi-
cally, Section A outlines the development of motivation-based 
abortion prohibitions in response to a perceived need to address 
discriminatory abortion practices in the United States. Section 
B then shows that while the constitutionality of these laws has 
been litigated, the issue has not been resolved. Section C exam-
ines self-regulation practices within the assisted reproduction 
industry. Finally, Section D provides an overview of selective 
reduction and introduces some of the ethical and legal ques-
tions that it presents. 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE  
UNITED STATES 
While it is unclear whether sex selection is having wide-
spread consequences on the population of the United States,18 it 
is a global issue that has caught the attention of the United 
States legislature. The recent trend in state laws banning mo-
tivation-based abortions has a complex tangential relationship 
to the national debate over abortion access more generally.19 
 
 18. See generally BRIAN CITRO ET AL., REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS: 
SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2014) (discussing 
the prevalence of sex selection in the United States). 
 19. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“Laws banning sex-selective abortion purport to 
combat gender discrimination. However, the text of the laws and the state-
ments made in support of the bans during legislative hearings make it clear 
that they are intended to place restrictions on abortion services generally.”); 
Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating 
Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 2, 74 (2012) (“As states that oppose abortion become savvier about ways 
to restrict access, their legislative attentions have turned to restricting access 
to abortion based on the reason the procedure was sought.”); Kevin L. Boyd, 
Comment, The Inevitable Collision of Sex-Determination by Cell-Free Fetal 
DNA in Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and the Continual Statewide 
Expansion of Abortion Regulation Based on the Sex of the Child, 81 UMKC L. 
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This Section examines both the origins and prevalence of sex 
selection and the federal and state legislative responses to it. 
1. The Development of Selective Abortion Practices 
Globally, female children have long been the target of sex 
selective practices, and the increased accessibility of reproduc-
tive technologies may have exacerbated this disparity in recent 
years.20 Sex selection and the male gender preference are typi-
cally associated with South, East, and Central Asian countries 
where birth ratios are sometimes as high as 130 males per 100 
females.21 While some argue that sex selection is also prevalent 
in more developed parts of the world, others have cast doubt on 
whether such disproportionate selection is occurring at all.22 As 
more advanced sex-selective technologies have become availa-
ble,23 however, it is clear that the option to select for sex has be-
come more accessible to the United States population general-
ly.24  
Fertility patients may use a number of techniques to iden-
 
REV. 417, 453 (2012) (“The Arizona statute is one of the new ways that the an-
ti-choice movement has chosen to attack abortion rights and limit a woman’s 
access to abortion services.”). 
 20. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SE-
LECTION 1 (2011), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44577/1/97892415 
01460_eng.pdf; Sex-Selective Abortion: Gendercide in the Caucasus, ECONO-
MIST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21586617 
-son-preference-once-suppressed-reviving-alarmingly-gendercide-caucasus 
(noting that the spread of cheap ultrasound machines have correlated with an 
increase in the number of sex-selective abortions in eastern European coun-
tries including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia). 
 21. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at v. 
 22. Compare Samuel B. Casey, David B. Waxman & Amy T. Pedagno, No 
Girls Allowed: Sex-Selective Abortion and a Guide to Banning It in the United 
States, 5 REGENT J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 132–33 (2013) (“[M]ore boys than 
girls are born in the United States, by a ratio of 1.05 to 1. But among Ameri-
can families of Chinese, Korean and Indian descent, the likelihood of having a 
boy increased to 1.17 to 1 if the first child was a girl . . . [and] if the first two 
children were girls, the ratio for a third child was 1.51 to 1—or about 50 per-
cent greater—in favor of boys.” (quoting Sam Roberts, U.S. Births Hint at Bias 
for Sons in Some Asians, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2009/06/15/nyregion/15babies.html)), with CITRO ET AL., supra note 18 
(noting that the findings in the same study were based on outdated data that 
excluded several population groups and finding that “[t]he overall sex ratio at 
birth for all Asian Americans in the United States is 1.04”). 
 23. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, 
Committee Opinion No. 360: Sex Selection, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
475, 476 (2007) [hereinafter Committee Opinion No. 360] (describing three 
general methods of sex selection, including prefertilization, postfertilization 
and pretransfer, and post-implantation). 
 24. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 421–22. 
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tify and select the sex of a child, and many clinics now adver-
tise the availability of sex selection in the context of IVF.25 Prior 
to fertilization, patients may attempt to increase the likelihood 
of conceiving a child of a preferred sex through pre-
implantation sperm sorting, although there is little evidence 
confirming the safety or effectiveness of this method.26 In the 
context of IVF, patients often use pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis (PGD) after fertilization to select only male or female 
embryos for implantation.27 During pregnancy, patients may se-
lect from a number of prenatal methods of sex determination 
including amniocentesis, ultrasonography, and chorionic villus 
sampling.28 Once the sex of a fetus is identified, the mother may 
then decide whether to continue the pregnancy. If sex is identi-
fied prior to implantation, then she need only decide whether 
and how to proceed with implantation; if sex is identified post-
implantation, however, then the only method to select for sex is 
by abortion.29 Abortion is the most common method of sex selec-
tion30 and thus has earned the strongest legislative response. 
While sex selection for the purpose of “family balancing”31 
 
 25. See, e.g., Gender Selection, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., https://www 
.centerforhumanreprod.com/services/infertility-treatments/genderselection/ 
program (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); Gender Selection, FERTILITY INSTS., 
http://www.fertility-docs.com/programs-and-services/gender-selection/select 
-the-gender-of-your-baby-using-pgd.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) (advertis-
ing “virtually 100% accuracy” of PGD). 
 26. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at 14–15. 
 27. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 422. While it may seem that pre-
implantation selection methods could eliminate the need to consider sex at the 
point of selective reduction, not all IVF patients opt for pre-implantation 
screening, and those that do typically use the process to detect disease-causing 
genes rather than the sex of the fetus. See Gina Kolata, Ethics Questions Arise 
as Genetic Testing of Embryos Increases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/health/ethics-questions-arise-as-genetic 
-testing-of-embryos-increases.html (noting that an international survey found 
that only “2 percent of more than 27,000 uses of pre-implantation genetic di-
agnosis were made to choose a child’s sex”). Thus, even if PGD is widely used, 
there will still be many patients who go through the IVF process without se-
lecting for sex prior to implantation. 
 28. Id. at 424–26. 
 29. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at 14. 
 30. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-496, at 7 (2012) (noting that pre-implantation 
techniques “are not widely available or affordable, and make up a small frac-
tion of sex-selection procedures” and that “most sex-selection takes the form of 
abortion”). 
 31. “Family balancing” refers to gender selection “for the purposes of 
achieving a more balanced representation of both genders in a family.” Family 
Balancing, GENETICS & IVF INST., http://www.givf.com/familybalancing (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2015). 
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generates mixed views in public opinion,32 the medical commu-
nity generally considers sex selection to be an acceptable meth-
od of avoiding suspected risks of sex-linked genetic disorders.33 
Although the underlying moral and ethical justifications for 
aborting or reducing a fetus with genetic abnormalities are con-
troversial, this type of selection is common, and almost certain-
ly much more prevalent than selection for sex alone.34 State leg-
islatures have responded to both types of selection—selection 
for sex and selection to avoid a genetic abnormality—by enact-
ing laws prohibiting abortions where the woman’s motivation is 
based on the desire for such selection. 
2. Legislative Responses to Selective Abortion 
In 2012, the United States House of Representatives con-
sidered legislation aimed at restricting the practice of sex selec-
tion but did not approve it.35 Known as the Prenatal Nondis-
crimination Act (PRENDA), the bill proposed both criminal and 
civil liability for any person who “knowingly performs an abor-
tion knowing that such abortion is sought based on the sex, 
gender, color or race of the child, or the race of a parent of that 
child.”36 While the issue of race was ultimately dropped from 
the bill, leaving the ban on sex selection alone, the bill ulti-
mately failed for other political reasons.37 Thus, questions of its 
 
 32. See Deidre C. Webb, Note, The Sex Selection Debate: A Comparative 
Study of Sex Selection Laws in the United States and the United Kingdom, 10 
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 163, 195–96 (2013). 
 33. See Committee Opinion No. 360, supra note 23, at 475–76. 
 34. See Mark Leach, North Dakota Enacts Law Banning Down Syndrome-
Selective Abortion, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/north-dakota-enacts-law 
-banning-down-syndrome-selective-abortion (“[N]ot only is termination follow-
ing a prenatal diagnosis for conditions like Downs syndrome authorized, it is 
the choice most often made by those with a prenatal diagnosis and medical 
guidelines require obstetricians to counsel their patient about termination fol-
lowing a prenatal diagnosis.”). Although its precision is debated, the tradition-
ally cited rate of termination following a Down syndrome diagnosis is 90%—
more recent studies cite a rate closer to 75%. See Mark Leach, More Women 
Aborting & Continuing Down Syndrome Pregnancies, DOWN SYNDROME PRE-
NATAL TESTING (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting 
.com/more-women-aborting-continuing-down-syndrome-pregnancies. 
 35. See Jennifer Steinhauer, House Rejects Bill To Ban Sex-Selective Abor-
tions, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/us/ 
politics/house-rejects-bill-to-ban-sex-selective-abortions.html. 
 36. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th 
Cong. (2012). 
 37. Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 140–43; see also 
Steinhauer, supra note 35 (noting that on a vote of 246 to 168, the bill fell 
short of the two-thirds support required to pass, but that “Republicans did not 
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constitutionality and efficacy were never addressed, leaving an 
opening for future motivation-based abortion prohibitions at 
both the state and federal level. 
Congress’s failure to enact a federal motivation-based abor-
tion prohibition has not stopped states from enacting similar 
laws. Illinois and Pennsylvania have had such laws since 1985 
and 1989, respectively.38 In 2011, Oklahoma and Arizona en-
acted selective abortion prohibitions.39 In 2013, both North 
Carolina40 and North Dakota41 enacted laws prohibiting abor-
tions based on particular fetal characteristics. Other states, in-
cluding California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, In-
diana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia, have also 
proposed similar legislation.42 The legislatures of Colorado, In-
diana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Texas have similar bills before them again in 2015.43 Thus, at 
the time of publishing this Note, there are at least twenty-two 
states that have considered or are considering such legislation 
and at least six states that have already adopted it. 
These laws differ from state to state in theories of liability, 
punishment, application, and subject matter. For example, de-
pending on the state, performing a sex-selective abortion may 
warrant a conviction ranging from a misdemeanor to a felony.44 
 
anticipate that the legislation would pass, but saw it as an opportunity to force 
Democrats to vote on an issue with appeal among conservatives”). 
 38. Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 143. 
 39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-
731.2 (2011). 
 40. S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (prohibiting abor-
tions where the sex of the unborn child is a “significant factor” in the woman’s 
decision to seek the abortion). 
 41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013) (criminalizing abortions based 
solely on the sex, genetic abnormality, or potential genetic abnormality of the 
fetus). 
 42. See Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 144; Sital Kalantry, 
Sex-Selective Abortion Bans: Anti-Immigration or Anti-Abortion?, 16 GEO. J. 
INT’L AFFAIRS 140, 150 (2015). 
 43. H.B. 15-1162, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2015); S.B. 334, 
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 1547, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2015); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2015); Bill No. A06545, 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015); 
S.B. 108, 78th Gen. Assemb. (Or. 2015); H.B. 2986, 78th Gen. Assemb. (Or. 
2015); H.B. 113, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Tex. 2014). 
 44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (classifying the performance of a 
sex-selective reduction as a class 3 felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 
(classifying the performance of a sex-selective reduction as a class A misde-
meanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (2011) (classifying the performance 
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A violation can also result in additional punishments ranging 
from damages and fines to injunction and license revocation.45 
None of the existing laws impose liability on the woman upon 
whom the abortion was performed. 
While most of these laws apply only in limited circum-
stances, some may apply more broadly. Importantly, most of 
these laws include the word “solely.”46 The word “solely” limits 
the laws’ application to circumstances where a particular fetal 
characteristic is the only factor in the decision to seek an abor-
tion. Arizona’s law does not contain this limitation. It provides 
that “if sex is even one of the factors or aspects of the pregnant 
woman’s decision for terminating the pregnancy, whether due 
to gender-linked disorders or family balancing, the abortion is 
illegal and cannot be performed, or must be reported if per-
formed.”47 The laws that apply the most broadly only require 
that the decision to seek an abortion be “related to the sex” of 
the fetus.48 
Finally, while most of these laws only seek to prevent abor-
tions based on sex, an increasing number also aim to prevent 
abortions based on genetic abnormality. Such laws have been 
proposed in Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio and signed into law in 
North Dakota.49 Provisions banning both types of selection raise 
 
of a sex-selective reduction as a third-degree felony); H.B. 1585, 97th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2014) (making a violation of the law a class A misde-
meanor or a class D felony if the person has previously pled guilty to or been 
convicted of a violation). 
 45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (providing a civil cause of 
action for money damages to either the father of the unborn child if he was 
married to the mother at the time of the abortion, or to the mother’s parents if 
the mother is under 18); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2011) (providing a 
cause of action for injunctive relief and actual or punitive damages by the 
woman upon whom the abortion was performed or her family members, 
healthcare provider, a district attorney, or the Attorney General); Mo. H.B. 
1585 (imposing liability for damages, license suspension or revocation, and in-
junction). 
 46. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (imposing liability for “know-
ingly or recklessly perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion with 
knowledge that the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely on account 
of the sex of the unborn child” (emphasis added)); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
510/6 (2010) (prohibiting abortions sought “solely on account of the sex of the 
fetus”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (prohibiting physicians from perform-
ing any abortion that is not “necessary” and excluding abortions sought “sole-
ly” because of the sex of the unborn child from the definition of a “necessary” 
abortion). 
 47. Boyd, supra note 19, at 435. 
 48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.121 (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 49. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (criminalizing abortions 
based solely on the existence of a genetic abnormality or potential genetic ab-
normality); S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015) (prohibiting 
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constitutional questions regarding a woman’s right to a pre-
viability abortion and the legitimacy of states’ interests in pre-
venting discrimination, which are discussed in further detail in 
Part II. 
B. INTERPRETING AND VALIDATING MOTIVATION-BASED  
ABORTION PROHIBITIONS 
This Section provides the foundation for analyzing how 
state laws restricting motivation-based abortions would stand 
up against a constitutional challenge. Part I.B.1 briefly ex-
plains the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence re-
garding the validity of state abortion laws. Then, Part I.B.2 ex-
amines the challenges that have been brought against recently 
enacted motivation-based abortion prohibitions, finding that 
none of the laws have been challenged on grounds that give the 
Supreme Court an opportunity to actually review their consti-
tutionality. 
1. Current Judicial Standards for State Abortion Laws 
The Court in Roe v. Wade established a woman’s right to 
have an abortion prior to fetal viability, but provided that 
states could “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion [after via-
bility] except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of 
the life or health of the mother.”50 In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court expanded 
states’ ability to regulate, based on the “substantial state inter-
est in protecting potential life throughout pregnancy,” by allow-
ing pre-viability regulations that do not pose an “undue bur-
den” on a woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion.51 
 
the performance of an abortion on a woman who is seeking the abortion solely 
because of “a diagnosis or potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syn-
drome or any other disability”); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 
2015) (prohibiting the performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman who is 
known to be seeking the abortion “solely because the unborn child has been 
diagnosed with either Down syndrome or a potential for Down syndrome” or 
solely because the unborn child has been diagnosed with “either a genetic ab-
normality or a potential for a genetic abnormality”); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (prohibiting the performance of “an 
abortion on a pregnant woman who is seeking the abortion because of a test 
result indicating Down Syndrome in an unborn child or a prenatal diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome in an unborn child”). North Carolina’s law could also be in-
terpreted to apply to abortions sought on the basis of genetic abnormality 
where those abnormalities are sex-linked. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-
21.121 (explaining that the woman’s decision to seek an abortion need only be 
“related” to the sex of the fetus). 
 50. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
 51. 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992). 
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Recently, courts have both upheld52 and struck down several 
state abortion regulations under the Casey “undue burden” 
standard.53 
The Supreme Court’s statements in Casey suggest that the 
Court may uphold an abortion ban that applies prior to viabil-
ity, as long as it is a narrow ban justified by a state interest not 
considered in either Roe or Casey.54 In Roe, the Court struck 
down a Texas statute outlawing abortions at any time except to 
save the life of the mother, while the Casey Court upheld a 
statutory provision prohibiting a minor from having an abor-
tion without parental consent, unless a court is able to deter-
mine that she “is mature and capable of giving informed con-
sent and has in fact given her informed consent, or that an 
abortion would be in her best interests.”55 In doing so, the Court 
considered state interests in protecting potential life, safe-
guarding women’s health, and protecting minors.56 The Court 
has yet to consider the validity of state interests in eliminating 
discrimination in the context of abortion. 
States justify motivation-based abortion prohibitions as a 
means of eliminating discrimination.57 While states’ interest in 
eliminating discrimination has not yet been examined in the 
context of abortion law, it has been considered in the context of 
laws affecting expressive associational rights.58 Because the 
Supreme Court has upheld statutes that infringed on groups’ 
associational rights based on the states’ compelling interest in 
eliminating sex discrimination, there is a valid argument that 
 
 52. See Gillette, supra note 17, at 661 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
upheld state laws requiring doctors to inform women of the availability of ma-
terials regarding the physical characteristics of the fetus, requiring women to 
wait twenty-four hours before having an abortion, and requiring minors to ob-
tain parental consent and notification). 
 53. See Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1105–09 (2014) (discussing several recent cases 
in which federal courts have struck down state “fetal pain” statutes and “fetal 
heartbeat statutes” on the grounds that they unconstitutionally burdened a 
woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion).  
 54. See id. at 1111. 
 55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; see also Molony, supra note 53, at 1111–12. 
 56. Molony, supra note 53, at 1113–14. 
 57. See King, supra note 19, at 56–62 (identifying a legitimate state inter-
est in social integrity based on the potential social harms resulting from wide-
spread discriminatory selective abortions that would justify the regulation of 
noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis). 
 58. See Molony, supra note 53, at 1118–23 (discussing three cases in 
which the Supreme Court considered whether statutes prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation unconstitutionally in-
fringed on groups’ associational rights). 
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the same interest would justify a ban on selective abortions as 
long as it imposes no more than “a slight infringement on a 
woman’s right to choose.”59 The sex of a fetus alone has little to 
no relation to the mother’s health, the burdens and distresses 
of raising and caring for a child, or the mother’s liberty, so “any 
infringement that a narrow sex selection ban might impose on 
a woman’s right to choose reasonably [could] be characterized 
as slight or insubstantial.”60 Thus, it is possible that the Court 
would reject any future facial challenges to these statutes, be-
cause there is a significant state interest in preventing sex dis-
crimination, and eliminating the choice to have a boy as op-
posed to a girl (or a girl as opposed to a boy) poses no undue 
burden.61 
In scrutinizing the constitutionality of state abortion laws, 
the Supreme Court is also likely to be influenced by traditional 
canons of interpretation. When ruling on the constitutionality 
of state statutes, the Supreme Court will adhere to the “cardi-
nal principle” that, before declaring a statute unconstitutional, 
it will look for any “fairly possible” construction of the statute 
“by which the question may be avoided.”62 Although the Court 
has applied this canon inconsistently in abortion cases, it is 
possible that it will still influence the Court to uphold motiva-
tion-based abortion statutes in some form. In Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Justices 
O’Connor and White identified “an unprecedented canon of con-
struction under which ‘in cases involving abortion, a permissi-
ble reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs.’”63 But, 
more recently, the Court adhered to the “cardinal principle” in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, concluding that “[t]he canon of constitu-
tional avoidance . . . extinguishes any lingering doubt as to 
whether the Act covers [dilation and evacuation].”64 Justice 
 
 59. Id. at 1123–24. 
 60. Id. at 1129. 
 61. This analysis is also likely to apply to some degree to laws prohibiting 
abortions based on a genetic abnormality of the fetus, given the legitimacy of 
states’ interest in eliminating other forms of discrimination. See supra note 49 
and accompanying text. 
 62. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust 
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 629 (1993) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 
62 (1932); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.740, 749–50 (1961)). 
 63. 476 U.S. 747, 829 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 812 
(White, J., dissenting)). 
 64. 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007). Having determined that the law at issue in 
that case would have been unconstitutional if it prohibited the procedure of 
dilation and evacuation (D & E), the Court held that “the most reasonable 
reading and understanding” of the statute was that it did not prohibit that 
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Kennedy opined that this principle had, “in the past, fallen by 
the wayside when the Court confronted a statute regulating 
abortion,”65 but the Supreme Court and circuit courts generally 
adhered to it in cases subsequent to Gonzales.66 Therefore, the 
canon of constitutional avoidance is likely to continue to influ-
ence the courts when confronted with abortion statutes in fu-
ture cases. 
2. Constitutional Challenges to Existing State Laws Banning  
Motivation-Based Abortions 
In 1993, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois enjoined enforcement of Illinois’s ban on sex-
selective abortion in cases of pre-viability abortion.67 While this 
result suggests that the enforcement of similar laws in other 
states may also be enjoined, it does not suggest how the Su-
preme Court might rule. There are few other examples of 
courts deciding the constitutionality of these laws, particularly 
in more recent years. 
After the Arizona legislature passed the state’s current 
law, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) and the National Asian Pacific American 
Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) filed a lawsuit challenging its con-
stitutionality.68 The claim alleged that the Act denied equal 
protection by perpetuating racially discriminatory stereotypes 
about Black, Asian and Pacific Islander women, Asian culture, 
and abortion care.69 The United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona dismissed the claim on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by 
 
procedure, and therefore it could not be found invalid on its face on those 
grounds. Id. at 153–56. 
 65. Id. at 153. 
 66. See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 
F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (adopting a construction of a suicide advisory provi-
sion in a South Dakota statute so as to avoid a constitutional question); Rich-
mond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 176–77 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding a Virginia statute based on a narrow interpretation that the law 
“criminalizes both the intentional intact D & E and the accidental intact D & 
E, but only where the necessary scienter is present and no affirmative defense 
is presented”). But see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health 
Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “whether the 
Supreme Court applies this rule in the same way in abortion cases is uncer-
tain”). 
 67. Herbst v. O’Malley, No. 84 C 5602, 1993 WL 59142, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 2, 1993). 
 68. NAACP v. Horne, No. CV13-01079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2013); Complaint, Horne, 2013 WL 5519514. 
 69. Horne, 2013 WL 5519514, at *2. 
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them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,” and 
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.70 The court 
based its holding on Allen v. Wright, which “makes clear that 
stigmatizing injury alone is not sufficient for standing in equal 
protection cases,” and that plaintiffs must show that they “per-
sonally have been denied equal treatment.”71 The Red River 
Women’s Clinic, North Dakota’s only abortion clinic, brought a 
similar challenge against North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 banning 
abortions on the basis of either sex or genetic abnormality.72 
However, the clinic ultimately dropped its claim “because it de-
termined that the law doesn’t apply to its practice.”73 In 2013, 
the NAACP v. Horne plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.74 Oral argument is currently scheduled for December 9, 
2015.75 
C. REGULATING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
While the number of laws affecting reproductive rights in 
the United States has grown in recent years, they have almost 
exclusively focused on issues like abortion and birth control,76 
leaving practices in the assisted reproduction industry relative-
 
 70. Id. at *8. 
 71. Id. at *5 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.737 (1984)). 
 72. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Lawsuit Filed Challenging North Dakota Pre-
Viability Ban, RH REALITY CHECK (June 25, 2013, 2:25 PM), http:// 
rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/25/lawsuit-filed-challenging-north-dakota 
-pre-viability-ban. 
 73. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Red River Clinic Asks Court To Dismiss Its Le-
gal Challenge to Sex-Selection and Fetal Anomaly Bans, RH REALITY CHECK 
(Sept. 12, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/09/12/red-river 
-clinic-asks-court-to-dismiss-its-legal-challenge-to-sex-and-fetal-anomaly-bans. 
 74. Brief of Appellants, NAACP v. Horne, No. 13-17247 (9th Cir. filed 
Mar. 12, 2014), 2014 WL 1153838. Oral argument was scheduled at the time 
this Note was being published. Appellants’ Acknowledgment of Hearing No-
tice, NAACP v. Horne, No. 13-17247 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 1, 2015). Even if the 
Ninth Circuit or another federal court later finds motivation-based abortion 
prohibitions to be unconstitutional, this Note recognizes that states can and 
likely will modify these laws to comply. See infra Part II.A. For example, Ari-
zona and North Dakota might remove the ban on abortions based on race or 
genetic abnormality, while keeping the provision banning abortions based on 
sex, and all states may modify their sex-selective abortion laws to apply only 
prior to viability. 
 75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 76. See Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Marking the Fine Line: Ethics and the Reg-
ulation of Innovative Technologies in Human Reproduction, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 685, 698 (2010); see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014) (addressing the issue of employer opposition to certain meth-
ods of insurance-supplied birth control methods). 
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ly untouched by regulation.77 The only federal law currently 
pertaining to assisted reproduction technologies is the Fertility 
Clinic Success Rate and Certification act of 1992.78 This law re-
quires fertility clinics to annually report their pregnancy suc-
cess rates and certification status to the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services through the Centers for Disease Control.79 
Some states, including Arizona, California, New Hamp-
shire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have proposed their own 
laws pertaining to fertility practices.80 In 2013, the Arizona leg-
islature produced a bill proposing exhaustive requirements for 
fertility clinics to report the total number of live births 
achieved; the rate of live births per transfer; the percentage of 
live births per completed cycle of egg retrieval; the percentage 
of transferred embryos that implant; specific information re-
garding the safekeeping of embryos; the percentage of pregnan-
cies resulting in multifetal pregnancies, broken down by the 
number of fetuses; the percentage of live births having multiple 
infants; the number of selective reductions performed, broken 
down by the number of embryos transferred before the reduc-
tion; the percentage of selective reductions that resulted in a 
miscarriage; the percentage of premature births per single and 
multiple births; and the percentage of birth defects per single 
and multiple births.81 If enacted, this law would have been the 
broadest external regulation of the ART industry. 
Given the considerable variance in clinic success rates, the 
expense of assisted reproduction, and the potential impact on 
patient health, some regulation of the ART industry is needed. 
However, there are also valid arguments against such regula-
tion. First, the industry already self-regulates in many ways.82 
For example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology 
(SART) regularly issue guidelines for the ART industry.83 
 
 77. See Daar, supra note 13; Sandra T. Jimenez, Note, “My Body, My 
Right”: A Look into IVF Regulation Through the Abortion Legal Framework, 
33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 375, 384–85 (2012) (“Current ART regulation exists 
in the form of voluntary and legally unenforceable guidelines created collabo-
ratively by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the 
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) in lieu of federal or state 
statutes.”). 
 78. See Daar, supra note 13, at 642. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(a) (2012). 
 80. See Daar, supra note 13, at 646–50. 
 81. S.B. 1376, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013). 
 82. See Daar, supra note 13, at 658–60; Lyerly, supra note 76, at 702. 
 83. See Daar, supra note 13, at 658–59; Jimenez, supra note 77, at 384–
86. 
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ASRM continuously refines its guidelines for IVF embryo trans-
fers in an effort to reduce the number of high-order multiple 
pregnancies.84 Second, such regulation risks running afoul of 
fundamental procreative liberties.85 While some regulation of 
ART is appropriate, regulations like that proposed in Arizona 
could possibly undermine those liberties by burdening provid-
ers with redundant requirements and passing the added costs 
on to patients.86 
D. ETHICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF SELECTIVE  
REDUCTION 
Since the first successful birth of an infant conceived 
through IVF in 1978, this technique has grown worldwide to 
become one of the most popular methods of assisted reproduc-
tion.87 Along with this success, however, arise a number of com-
plications. The process of IVF, in short, involves treating the 
mother with fertility drugs to increase the production of eggs, 
retrieving and fertilizing the eggs outside of the mother’s uter-
us, and later transferring the healthy embryos back into the 
 
 84. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Criteria for Number of Embryos to Trans-
fer: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 44, 44 (2013), http://www 
.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_ 
Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_ 
embryos(1).pdf (issuing a new set of guidelines, further refining the guidelines 
last issued in 2009, reducing the recommended number of embryos to transfer 
to a single embryo for women under 35, no more than two embryos for women 
between 35 and 37, no more than three embryos for women 38 to 40, and no 
more than five embryos for women 41 to 42). 
 85. See Daar, supra note 13, at 641–42 (considering Supreme Court deci-
sions protecting procreative liberties by affirming the constitutional right not 
to procreate and opining that “[a]ny regulation of ART that has the effect of 
interfering with procreational choices could be invalidated as interfering with 
fundamental rights”); Jimenez, supra note 77, at 391. But see Radhika Rao, 
Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1077, 1113–21 (1998) (opining that procreational rights are based in the 
constitutional right to privacy and as such, are limited). 
 86. See, e.g., Arizona Legislators Put Fertility Clinics Under Microscope 
(Arizona Nightly News television broadcast) (noting that the CDC already 
publishes much of the information sought by the Arizona bill), http://archive 
.azcentral.com/video/#/Arizona+legislators+put+fertility+clinics+under+ 
microscope/2189339366001; Letter from RESOLVE: The National Infertility 
Association to Arizona Senator Andy Biggs (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www 
.resolve.org/get-involved/the-center-for-infertility-justice/state-legislation/ 
resolves-letter-to-arizona-senators.pdf (noting that because Arizona law does 
not require insurers to cover infertility treatment, any added costs would fall 
to patients).  
 87. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 789–90 (noting that as of 
1992, over 10,000 IVF infants had been delivered worldwide, and more than 
180 IVF programs were operating in the United States). 
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mother’s uterus.88 Physicians originally took an aggressive ap-
proach to transferring embryos to increase the mother’s chance 
of pregnancy.89 Because IVF patients make substantial finan-
cial and emotional investments in the process, IVF physicians 
naturally experience pressure to get results faster by transfer-
ring higher numbers of embryos.90 Furthermore, IVF is a com-
petitive industry where fertility clinics have a “vested stake in 
the outcome of fertility treatments”91 and thus an incentive to 
continue higher-order transfers. Although they are not legally 
binding, ASRM guidelines may temper some of this pressure by 
limiting the number of recommended transfers.92 High-order 
transfer rates have dropped since the late 1998, when the 
ASRM first published these guidelines.93 Despite the industry’s 
great strides in reducing the number of high-order multiples 
produced through IVF, it has not yet succeeded in reducing the 
number of twins.94 The CDC reports that while the birth rate 
for triplets and higher-order multiples dropped four percent be-
tween 2012 and 2013, the twin birth rate increased by two per-
cent, reaching a new high of 33.7 per 1,000 births.95 
 
 88. Id. at 790. 
 89. Id. at 791. 
 90. See Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: Multiple 
Births, Selective Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 
50–51 (2000). 
 91. Id. at 50. 
 92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Tarun Jain et al., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Out-
comes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1639, 1641 (2004). Patterns of embryo-transfer practice are 
likely also influenced by other factors, such as improvements in technology. Id. 
at 1643–44. Patient preference is also likely to influence embryo-transfer prac-
tices, as many fertility patients desire multifetal pregnancies and may prefer 
to transfer higher numbers of embryos. See Ginny L. Ryan et al., The Desire of 
Infertile Patients for Multiple Births, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 500, 503 
(2004) (noting that one in five women in one study listed multiple births as 
their most desired outcome of infertility treatment). 
 94. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology’s 2013 national data 
summary showed that twin births constituted 28.2% of live births for women 
under 35, which was a decrease from 29.5% in 2012, 30.8% in 2011, 32.4% in 
2010, 33.3% in 2008, and 32.7% in 2004. Clinic Summary Report, SOC’Y FOR 
ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_Public 
MultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); see also Laurie 
Tarkan, Lowering Odds of Multiple Births, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at F1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19mult.html (stating that while 
efforts to reduce multiples by transferring fewer embryos per IVF cycle have 
“substantially lowered the rates of triplets . . . they have not made a dent in 
the twin rate”). 
 95. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL 
STATS. REPS. 1, 2 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_ 
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While transferring higher numbers of embryos increases 
the chances of pregnancy, it also increases the odds of 
multifetal pregnancy.96 Because of the high risks associated 
with multifetal pregnancies, physicians will often urge their 
patients to consider selective reduction.97 The procedure has be-
come more common since it was first performed, with one cen-
ter reporting more than 2,000 procedures by 2008.98 The tech-
nical process of selective reduction, performed in the first 
trimester, involves inserting a needle into the chest or heart of 
the fetus and injecting potassium chloride, after which “[t]he 
terminated fetuses remain in the woman’s uterus where they 
are resorbed, allowing the remaining fetuses to grow normal-
ly.”99 Although most physicians determine which fetus to ter-
minate by proximity to the maternal abdominal wall,100 some 
have said that they will consider other factors including genetic 
abnormalities or the parents’ preference to have a child of a 
particular sex.101 Over time, physicians have performed more 
selective reductions with increasing success,102 but the proce-
dures are still not without risk.103 
Because of the nature of the procedure, scholars frequently 
 
01.pdf. 
 96. See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 84 (“High-order multiple 
pregnancy (three or more implanted embryos) is an undesirable consequence . 
. . of assisted reproductive technologies.”); supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 97. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 98. Joanne Stone et al., Contemporary Outcomes with the Latest 1000 
Cases of Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction (MPR), AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNE-
COLOGY, Oct. 2008, at 406.e1, http://www.ajog.org/article/S0002-9378(08) 
00627-3/pdf (referring to Mount Sinai Medical Center). 
 99. Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 780–81. 
 100. Id. at 781. 
 101. See Evans, supra note 6; see also Ruth Padawer, The Two-Minus-One 
Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/ 
14/magazine/the-two-minus-one-pregnancy.html (noting that although most 
doctors once refused to offer sex selection, “that ethical demarcation has erod-
ed” in the last decade). 
 102. Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 788 (noting that United States 
physicians reported over 200 procedures by 1992, as well as a decrease in the 
fetal loss rate from 33.3% to 9.5%, compared to the general fetal mortality rate 
of 16% to 41% among multifetal pregnancies). 
 103. See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 84 (stating that selective 
reduction “may result in the loss of all fetuses, does not completely eliminate 
the risks associated with multiple pregnancy, and may have adverse psycho-
logical consequences”); see also Kathleen Lee, In Support of a Gender-Neutral 
Framework for Resolving Selective Reduction Disputes, 44 FAM. L.Q. 135, 140–
41 (2010) (noting that “selective reduction carries with it heavy psychological 
burdens” and also produces moral and ethical dilemmas for parents consider-
ing the procedure). 
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compare and distinguish selective reduction and abortion.104 
While both involve the termination of one or more fetuses, the 
two procedures differ in technical respects, context, and objec-
tives.105 Abortions are performed in an “increasingly hostile” po-
litical and regulatory climate, but “selective reduction occurs in 
the context of the vast, widely-used and largely unregulated 
fertility industry.”106 Whereas a pregnant woman typically 
seeks an abortion because her pregnancy is unwanted, selective 
reduction takes place after the mother has gone to significant 
lengths seeking to become pregnant.107 Most state abortion 
laws, however, do not explicitly consider these distinctions in 
motivation; rather, they define abortion as “the termination of 
a human pregnancy.”108 The aim of selective reduction is not to 
terminate a pregnancy, but to preserve it along with the health 
of the mother and remaining fetus.109 In spite of these differ-
ences, some scholars consider the two procedures legally identi-
cal.110 The extent of a pregnant woman’s power to choose which 
fetus to terminate by selective reduction in a state with laws 
prohibiting motivation-based abortions requires an analysis of 
how selective reduction might fit within the legal definition of 
abortion. 
II.  HOW MOTIVATION-BASED ABORTION LAWS COULD 
CREATE BARRIERS TO WOMEN SEEKING SELECTIVE 
REDUCTIONS   
While selective reduction is not without its ethical ques-
tions, physicians consider the procedure ethical and even nec-
essary in many situations.111 Nonetheless, the growing preva-
lence of motivation-based abortion prohibitions across the 
country112 may create significant barriers to women seeking this 
 
 104. See, e.g., Pinchuk, supra note 90, at 34–51. See generally Rao, supra 
note 16 (discussing the legal and ethical distinctions between the procedures). 
 105. See Pinchuk, supra note 90, at 34–51. 
 106. Id. at 50. 
 107. See id. at 34. 
 108. Lee, supra note 103, at 145. 
 109. See id. at 144. 
 110. See, e.g., John Robertson, Is Selective Reduction Covered by State 
Abortion Law?, HARV. L. SCH.: BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Apr. 10, 2013), http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/04/10/john-robertson-on-is-selective 
-reduction-covered-by-state-abortion-law-online-abortion-and-reproductive 
-technology-symposium. 
 111. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 112. As of the time of writing this Note, there are at least six states that 
have enacted motivation-based abortion prohibitions and at least ten states 
that have proposed such legislation, although it has yet to be enacted. See su-
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vital procedure. Although there are many other factors that 
could have a chilling effect on physicians providing selective 
reduction,113 this Note focuses on motivation-based abortion 
prohibitions as the most pressing barrier. 
Section A first probes the constitutional validity of laws 
prohibiting abortions on the basis of motivation, then, assum-
ing such laws are not unconstitutional per se, identifies which 
laws are most likely to pass constitutional muster. Second, as-
suming such laws are generally valid, Section B considers their 
application to selective reduction, concluding that while there 
is a strong argument that selective reduction should not legally 
qualify as abortion, states may still seek to apply motivation-
based abortion prohibitions in cases of selective reduction. Fi-
nally, to the extent that these laws validly limit the availability 
of selective reduction, Section C considers the implications of 
such laws in the types of cases where a particular fetal charac-
teristic is more likely to be an ethically relevant consideration 
as part of a selective reduction decision. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF MOTIVATION-BASED  
ABORTION PROHIBITIONS 
Some have challenged these laws as discriminatory,114 but 
the Supreme Court has not yet determined their constitutional-
ity.115 Despite the likelihood that many of these laws are inva-
lid, some have a significant chance of survival.116 This Section 
applies recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on state abortion 
laws, discussed in Part I.B, to determine which states’ laws 
would be the most likely to survive a constitutional challenge.117 
This Section concludes that while there is a strong argument 
 
pra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Christine E. Dehlendorf & Kevin Grumbach, Medical Liability In-
surance As a Barrier to the Provision of Abortion Services in Family Medicine, 
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1770, 1770–71 (2008) (finding that “[t]he cost and 
availability of liability insurance have emerged as a prominent barrier” for 
family physicians providing abortions). 
 114. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
 115. Gillette, supra note 17, at 671; King, supra note 19, at 30; Molony, su-
pra note 53, at 1092. 
 116. Even if they are found to be unconstitutional, this Note acknowledges 
that many state legislatures are likely to reenact modified versions of these 
statutes. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 117. While a full analysis of the constitutionality of these additional prohi-
bitions is outside the scope of this Note, a full analysis is not necessary to the 
analysis below, which explores how these prohibitions would apply in several 
hypothetical scenarios assuming that the prohibitions are upheld or remain 
unchallenged. 
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that constitutional protection should extend to any reason a 
woman may have for seeking pre-viability abortion,118 states 
may permissibly impose limitations on pre-viability abortions 
in narrow, limited circumstances. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe119 and Casey120 create 
the judicial standard that the Court will use to determine how 
far states can go in limiting a woman’s right to have an abor-
tion based on her motivation. If a court interprets Casey to bar 
only blanket or comprehensive pre-viability abortion bans but 
allow some narrower bans, then the narrowest motivation-
based abortion prohibitions are those most likely to be upheld. 
None of the state laws discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Note con-
tain provisions limiting their application to post-viability abor-
tions. Thus, they would all be subject to Casey’s undue burden 
test for pre-viability abortion bans, should the Court choose 
this route. The laws most likely to survive this test are those 
that apply only to abortions sought “solely” on the basis of the 
sex of the fetus. This limitation would allow a woman to con-
sider the sex of the fetus where her decision to terminate her 
pregnancy is ultimately influenced by other, permissible rea-
sons. 
Those laws that purport to apply the most broadly—North 
Carolina’s and Arizona’s—are the least likely to survive a con-
stitutional challenge. North Carolina’s law applies even where 
sex selection is merely one among other reasons for terminating 
a pregnancy, and it contains no exceptions relating to the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.121 The Arizona 
law is also problematic because it may apply in any scenario in 
which a pregnant woman considers the sex of the fetus in her 
decision to opt for an abortion.122 Because they are limited in 
scope, most other states’ laws are more likely to survive the Ca-
sey undue burden test, should Casey be interpreted to allow 
narrow pre-viability abortion prohibitions. Even if the Court 
determines that such laws are unconstitutional because they 
limit a woman’s choice to have an abortion prior to viability, 
state legislatures can easily modify their laws to apply only 
post-viability (in states in which a post-viability abortion is 
otherwise permitted). 
In contrast to laws only prohibiting abortions for the pur-
 
 118. See Gillette, supra note 17, at 671–81; King, supra note 19, at 30–43. 
 119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 121. See Molony, supra note 53, at 1130. 
 122. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011). 
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pose of sex selection, those that also prohibit abortions based on 
other qualities, such as genetic abnormality or race, raise more 
complex questions. If the state has a compelling interest in 
eliminating discrimination based on sex, it follows that the 
state might also have a compelling interest in eliminating other 
forms of discrimination.123 However, these laws may face addi-
tional hurdles in passing the undue burden test, even if Casey 
is interpreted to allow some narrow pre-viability abortion bans. 
Arizona’s prohibition on race-selective abortions is similar to 
prohibitions on sex-selective abortions, because like the sex of 
the fetus, the race of the fetus does little to affect the woman’s 
health or the burdens of raising a child.124 Thus, laws that pro-
hibit abortions based solely on genetic abnormality may be less 
likely to survive a constitutional challenge because, unlike sex 
or race, a genetic abnormality may impose significant financial, 
medical, and emotional burdens on the mother.125 
B. SELECTIVE REDUCTION ON THE SPECTRUM OF ABORTION 
As discussed above, scholars have identified a number of 
ways to distinguish selective reduction from abortion.126 While 
the two procedures are conceptually and ethically separable, 
their legal separability is less clear. Ultimately, the legal status 
of selective reduction depends on statutory interpretation, as 
selective reduction is not mentioned explicitly in most state 
abortion statutes. Using a statutory purpose approach,127 “a 
 
 123. See Moloney, supra note 53, at 1118–19 (noting several cases in which 
the Supreme Court considered whether public accommodation statutes prohib-
iting discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation in-
fringed on a group’s associational rights using a balancing test, rather than 
applying strict scrutiny). 
 124. Cf. Clifford Ward, Suit Filed over Mix-Up at Downers Grove Sperm 
Bank Is Dismissed, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
suburbs/downers-grove/news/ct-dupage-sperm-bank-suit-met-0904-20150903 
-story.html (reporting that in dismissing this case, the judge agreed that an 
action for “‘wrongful birth’ could not be legally sustained in a case where a 
healthy child was born”). 
 125. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 842 n.306 (noting that 
courts have allowed damages in wrongful birth actions including the expenses 
of ordinary and extraordinary medical care and education of a disabled child, 
the expenses of pain and suffering of the mother during pregnancy, and the 
emotional distress of the parents); Padawer, supra note 101 (“What drives [the 
decision to abort a fetus with an identified genetic condition] is not just con-
cern over the quality of life for the future child but also the emotional, finan-
cial or social difficulty for parents of having a child with extra needs.”). 
 126. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 127. At times, the Supreme Court has used this method of statutory inter-
pretation where the words of the statute themselves do not provide adequate 
clarity. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 
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natural reading” of most abortion statutes would determine 
that they include selective reduction, “[s]ince protection of fe-
tuses is a main purpose of such statutes.”128 A more technical, 
strictly language-based interpretation,129 however, can substan-
tiate a plausible argument that selective reduction should not 
be covered. 
Most of the state laws discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Note 
define abortion in nearly identical terms. Arizona law, for ex-
ample, defines abortion as “the use of any means to terminate 
the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of a woman with 
knowledge that the termination by those means will cause, 
with reasonable likelihood, the death of the unborn child.”130 It 
excludes “the use of any means to save the life or preserve the 
health of the unborn child, to preserve the life or health of the 
child after a live birth, to terminate an ectopic pregnancy or to 
remove a dead fetus.”131 The language in the Oklahoma, Illinois, 
and Pennsylvania statutes is very similar.132 
North Dakota’s law is unique because it explicitly includes 
selective reduction in the definition of abortion. The law defines 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (2006) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)) (“[T]he Court employed a purposivist approach to 
manufacture statutory clarity and to overrule an agency interpretation that 
otherwise seemed well within the bounds of the statutory text.”). 
 128. Robertson, supra note 110. 
 129. The Supreme Court has long used the “plain language rule” as the 
starting point of statutory construction. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (“[I]n all cases involving statutory con-
struction, ‘our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,’ . . . 
and we assume ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary 
meaning of the words used.’” (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 
63, 68 (1982))); United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) 
(“[W]here the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to 
its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words 
employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.”). 
 130. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2015). 
 131. Id. 
 132. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/2 (2010) (defining abortion as “the use of any 
instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance or device to terminate the 
pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with an intention other than to 
increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the 
child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-730 
(2011) (defining abortion as “the use or prescription of any instrument, medi-
cine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the 
pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an intention other than to 
increase the probability of a live birth, [or] to preserve the life or health of the 
child after live birth”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2011) (defining 
abortion as “[t]he use of any means to terminate the clinically diagnosable 
pregnancy of a woman with knowledge that the termination by those means 
will, with reasonable likelihood, cause the death of the unborn child”). 
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abortion as “the act of using or prescribing any instrument, 
medicine, drug, or any other substance, device, or means with 
the intent to terminate the clinically diagnosable intrauterine 
pregnancy of a woman, including the elimination of one or more 
unborn children in a multifetal pregnancy, with knowledge that 
the termination by those means will with reasonable likelihood 
cause the death of the unborn child.”133 Other states’ abortion 
laws do not refer to multifetal pregnancies or selective reduc-
tion. 
Selective reduction does not precisely fit within most 
states’ statutory definitions of abortion. State laws generally 
define abortion in terms of terminating a pregnancy.134 The 
purpose of a selective reduction is not to terminate pregnancy, 
but to preserve the pregnancy along with the health of both the 
pregnant woman and the remaining fetuses.135 North Dakota’s 
is the only law that anticipates multifetal pregnancies and ex-
plicitly includes selective reduction in its definition of abortion, 
suggesting that North Dakota is the only state where a selec-
tive reduction would clearly fall under the purview of its abor-
tion statutes. 
While selective reduction is not explicitly covered by most 
state law definitions of abortion, if state legislatures intend to 
impose limits on selective reduction as part of their interest in 
protecting fetal life, it is possible that they would amend their 
laws to mirror North Dakota’s. However, many state laws con-
tain exceptions that would encompass selective reduction. 
First, a selective reduction is arguably most often used as a 
means for increasing the probability of a live birth, which is a 
statutory exception under Oklahoma law.136 This conclusion is 
subject to debate, however, because some women elect to have 
selective reductions for reasons other than increasing the prob-
ability of a live birth.137 In these cases, selective reduction may 
not meet the exception of increasing the probability of a live 
birth. 
Second, many selective reductions may fall under the ex-
 
 133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013). 
 134. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 800 (“Plainly, the principal 
purpose of selective reduction is to produce one or more live births. Because 
the law seems to define abortion by one’s motivation to avoid producing a live 
birth, the legal definition of abortion cannot also include selective reduction.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (relating one woman’s decision to 
reduce twins to a singleton based on her concern that because of her age and 
financial position, she would not be able to care for two children). 
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ception of necessity. In Pennsylvania, for example, an abortion 
is permissible if the physician “determines that, in his best clin-
ical judgment, the abortion is necessary.”138 The statute does 
not define the term “necessary” outright, although it provides 
limitations.139 The law requires that, in determining necessity, 
the physician exercise his or her “best clinical judgment . . . in 
light of all factors (physical, emotional, psychological, familial 
and the woman’s age) relevant to the well-being of the wom-
an.”140 A literal interpretation of the law suggests that, should 
selective reduction be classified as a form of abortion, it would 
permit a physician to perform the procedure based on consider-
ations other than the preservation of the pregnancy or the 
health of the mother and the remaining fetuses. 
Based on a textual, “plain meaning” interpretation, it is 
unlikely that a court would interpret any of the examined state 
laws, except for North Dakota’s,141 to apply to selective reduc-
tion. The Supreme Court is likely to use this method of inter-
pretation when examining a state statute limiting the right to 
seek an abortion.142 If state legislatures intend these laws to en-
compass selective reduction, however, they can amend their 
laws to mirror North Dakota’s. The next Part of this Note as-
sumes that most motivation-based abortion prohibitions could 
either be interpreted to apply to selective reduction, or modified 
to explicitly include it. 
C. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF SELECTIVE ABORTION  
PROHIBITIONS TO SELECTIVE REDUCTION 
With few examples of actual prosecutions of physicians un-
der these laws, it is difficult to determine how a motivation-
based abortion prohibition would apply in a typical abortion 
case,143 much less in a case of selective reduction. Assuming 
 
 138. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 2011). 
 139. Id. (providing that except in cases of emergency, prior to performing 
the procedure, the physician must have a private consultation with the woman 
to enable the physician to determine whether, based on his best clinical judg-
ment, the abortion is necessary). 
 140. Id. 
 141. The phrase, “including the elimination of one or more unborn children 
in a multifetal pregnancy” suggests that North Dakota has banned selective 
reduction all together. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013). While this 
provision raises questions of the law’s constitutionality, a full analysis is out-
side the scope of this Note. 
 142. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939–40 (2000) (determining 
that the “plain language” of Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban covered two 
distinct but similar procedures). 
 143. Boyd, supra note 19, at 438–42 (concluding that prosecutors would 
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that selective reduction could fit within state law definitions of 
abortion, and these laws remain unchallenged, access to selec-
tive reduction may be limited in the same ways that access to 
abortion is limited in these states. If that is the case, physicians 
must determine the extent to which they can offer choices in se-
lective reduction. In other words, could state law command that 
the choice of which fetuses to reduce and which to keep must be 
determined by their fortuitous location in the mother’s womb? 
This Section seeks to answer these questions by exploring hy-
pothetical, but probable, situations in which women opt for se-
lective reduction. First, Part II.C.1 analyzes various situations 
where a woman carrying multiples discovers that one of them 
carries a genetic abnormality. Then, Part II.C.2 explores simi-
lar situations where a woman carrying multiples is offered the 
choice of which fetuses to save or reduce based on sex.144 Ulti-
mately, this discussion aims to determine whether states can 
mandate that the selective reduction of a fetus be based solely 
on the fetus’s random location in the womb. 
1. Selection as the Sole Motivation for an Abortion or Selective  
Reduction 
If selective reduction is otherwise permissible, the legiti-
macy of selecting which fetus to keep and which to terminate 
based on sex or genetic abnormality depends on state law. If 
the state has enacted a motivation-based abortion prohibition, 
the first thing to consider is whether the law is limited to cases 
in which sex selection is the sole motivation for the decision. 
Therefore, the use of the term “solely” is critical in determining 
how different states’ motivation-based abortion prohibitions 
 
face significant hurdles in prosecuting abortion providers in most scenarios 
that would arise under Arizona’s motivation-based abortion statute). 
 144. Arizona’s motivation-based abortion law anticipates a third scenario, 
race selection, which is not analyzed in this Note, but warrants a full discus-
sion on its own terms. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011). It is pos-
sible that such a prohibition would affect selective reduction and abortion in 
ways not anticipated by the statute. For example, there are cases in which 
women have given birth to children of different races due to mix-ups in IVF 
clinics, raising the question of whether a woman could selectively reduce the 
child of a different race, or abort the entire pregnancy rather than carry an-
other’s child. See, e.g., Clare Dyer, Judge Backs Adoption of IVF Mix-Up 
Twins, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2003, 9:25 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
uk/2003/feb/27/claredyer; see also Meredith Rodriguez, Lawsuit: Wrong Sperm 
Delivered to Lesbian Couple, CHIC. TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2014, 7:22 AM), http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-sperm-donor-lawsuit-met 
-20140930-story.html (discussing a lawsuit brought by an Ohio woman against 
a sperm bank for mistakenly implanting her with genetic material from an 
African-American donor, resulting in a mixed-race child). 
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might apply to selective reduction. 
Presumptively, if a woman has already chosen to undergo a 
selective reduction, she has chosen to do so not because she on-
ly wants children with or without a particular characteristic, 
but because preserving her health and the well-being of the 
remaining fetuses warrants it,145 or because she feels that she 
cannot or does not want to accommodate more than one child.146 
Thus, the types of motivations generally anticipated by the mo-
tivation-based abortion prohibitions discussed in Part I.A.2 
would rarely be the sole motivation for a selective reduction. 
This is not necessarily the case, however, with respect to twin 
pregnancies. Until recently, many physicians did not consider 
selective reduction of twins a necessity, and many refused to 
perform them at all.147 Although the number of twin-to-
singleton reductions has increased,148 it is less likely to be con-
sidered a medical necessity than the reduction of high-order 
multiples.149 Given the fact that physicians may be less likely to 
recommend a selective reduction of twins out of medical neces-
 
 145. See Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2, at 408 (directing that in 
cases of high-order multifetal pregnancies, patient counseling should “convey 
that multifetal pregnancy reduction increases the chance of achieving at least 
one live birth and decreases the risk of a spontaneous loss of the entire preg-
nancy”).  
 146. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (“The idea of managing two infants 
at this point in her life terrified her. [Jenny] and her husband already had 
grade-school-age children, and she took pride in being a good mother. She felt 
that twins would soak up everything she had to give, leaving nothing for her 
older children. Even the twins would be robbed, because, at best, she could 
give each one only half of her attention and, she feared, only half of her love. 
Jenny desperately wanted another child, but not at the risk of becoming a se-
cond-rate parent.”). 
 147. Compare id. (noting that many if not most physicians who perform 
selective reductions will not perform a reduction of twins to a singleton if not 
medically necessary), with Mark I. Evans et al., Fetal Reduction from Twins to 
a Singleton: A Reasonable Consideration?, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
102, 102 (2004) (concluding that, given the risk of spontaneous twin pregnancy 
loss, the experience of physicians in safely reducing multifetal pregnancies, 
and data suggesting that the likelihood of a successful birth is higher after a 
reduction of twins, “twin-to-singleton reductions might be considered with ap-
propriate constraints and safeguards”). 
 148. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (noting that between 1997 and 2010 
at Mount Sinai Medical Center, one of the largest selective reduction provid-
ers, the number of overall reductions to a singleton increased from 15% to 
60%, and in 2010, 62% of reductions to a singleton were twin-to-singleton re-
ductions). 
 149. See Mark I. Evans & David W. Britt, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction: 
Evolution of the Ethical Arguments, 28 SEMINARS REPROD. MED. 295, 301 
(2010) (recommending “that the obstetrics community not adopt elective twin 
reduction as a general practice but refer patients who make this request to 
centers with experience in MFPR that also offer counseling about this choice”). 
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sity, it is easier to imagine a woman being motivated to reduce 
solely by the sex or genetic abnormality of a fetus in a twin 
pregnancy. 
2. Selection to Avoid Genetic Abnormality 
As technologies have advanced to allow earlier detection of 
fetal abnormalities, abortions and selective reductions of the 
fetuses carrying them have become more common, regardless of 
whether those abnormalities are life-threatening.150 The deci-
sion to terminate a fetus to avoid having a child with a genetic 
disorder is often driven by concern not only for the quality of 
life of the child but also the impact on family life and the emo-
tional, financial, or social concerns of the parents.151 Consider a 
woman who has become pregnant with twins after IVF and is 
healthy enough to give birth to the twins safely. She intends to 
carry both to term until genetic testing reveals that one fetus 
carries a genetic abnormality. She then opts for a selective re-
duction. If her physician is aware of the woman’s intentions 
and motivations and willing to perform a reduction from twins 
to a singleton, could the physician be prohibited from perform-
ing the selective reduction? 
To date, Indiana,152 North Dakota,153 Missouri,154 and Ohio155 
are the only states to attempt motivation-based abortion prohi-
bitions focused on genetic abnormality.156 North Dakota’s law 
both prohibits abortions based solely on genetic abnormality or 
the risk of a genetic abnormality157 and explicitly includes selec-
tive reduction within the definition of abortion.158 If the wom-
an’s sole reason for opting for selective reduction is based on 
the genetic abnormality of the fetus, then she could face signifi-
cant obstacles in any state that has enacted a law like North 
Dakota’s. If the genetic abnormality could affect the health of 
the remaining fetus, then it is possible that she would still be 
able to seek a selective reduction under the statutory exception 
for saving the life or preserving the health of the unborn 
 
 150. See Padawer, supra note 101 (“Many studies show the vast majority of 
patients abort fetuses after prenatal tests reveal genetic conditions like Down 
syndrome that are not life-threatening.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015). 
 153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013). 
 154. H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 155. H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016). 
 156. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1. 
 158. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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child.159 To avoid risking the harsh consequences of liability, a 
physician in North Dakota would likely refrain from perform-
ing the procedure and refer the woman to a provider in another 
state.160 
Even though North Dakota’s abortion laws explicitly in-
clude selective reductions, a more nuanced, text-based interpre-
tation of the statute may also leave some room for the selective 
reduction of a fetus with a genetic abnormality if the primary 
reason for the reduction is something other than the existence 
of the abnormality. The statute prohibits physicians from “in-
tentionally perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion 
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abor-
tion solely . . . [b]ecause the unborn child has been diagnosed 
with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic 
abnormality.”161 The most recent bills in Indiana, Ohio, and 
Missouri contain similar language.162 This language leaves a 
gap that may allow a pregnant woman to choose which fetus to 
keep in a selective reduction procedure, provided that she does 
not initially seek the reduction because of the genetic abnor-
mality. 
The North Dakota statute is only written to prevent selec-
tion in the decision of whether to terminate, rather than which 
fetus to terminate.163 In the above scenario, because the woman 
did not decide to have a selective reduction until she found out 
about the abnormality of one of the fetuses, her physician could 
be prohibited from performing the reduction under North Da-
kota law. Conversely, had she been pregnant with higher-order 
multiples and wanted to reduce the number to twins for the sa-
ke of her health and the health of the remaining fetuses, the 
language of the statute may allow her doctor to perform the se-
 
 159. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1. 
 160. Cf. Mark Leach, Does the North Dakota Law Banning Down Syn-
drome-Selective Abortions Impose an Undue Burden?, DOWN SYNDROME PRE-
NATAL TESTING (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/ 
does-the-north-dakota-law-banning-down-syndrome-selective-abortions 
-impose-an-undue-burden (noting that North Dakotans already face a signifi-
cant barrier in seeking an abortion to begin with, as there is only one abortion 
clinic in the state, and it is in Fargo, on the Minnesota state border). If just 
living in North Dakota is enough to prevent a woman from seeking an abor-
tion due to lack of providers, it is likely that she would have to travel to seek a 
selective reduction anyway. 
 161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (emphasis added). 
 162. See S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 439, 98th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016). 
 163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–02.1–04.1. 
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lective reduction. In this scenario, she would not be seeking the 
reduction because of the genetic abnormality of the fetus, but 
she may consider the abnormality as a factor in deciding which 
fetuses to reduce and which to keep. Ultimately, however, the 
effect of the law is still likely to produce a chilling effect that 
discourages North Dakota physicians from performing selective 
reductions.164 
The same analysis appears to apply to Missouri’s proposed 
law.165 The Missouri bill differs from North Dakota’s law in that 
it does not explicitly include selective reduction in its definition 
of abortion, although it may be read to implicitly include selec-
tive reduction.166 In either state, the practical effect may be that 
a prudent physician would be unwilling to abort or selectively 
reduce a fetus with a genetic abnormality, given the uncertain-
ty of the laws’ application to selective reductions and the harsh 
penalties for violations.167 The outcome may be different, how-
ever, in the case of high-order multiples. 
Consider a similar scenario in which a woman who has 
gone through IVF becomes pregnant with triplets or quadru-
plets. Her doctor recommends a selective reduction for the sake 
of her health and the success of the pregnancy and finds that 
one of the fetuses carries a genetic abnormality. In this case, a 
selective reduction of the fetus carrying the abnormality should 
be permissible assuming that the ultimate purpose of the re-
duction is to preserve the health of the mother and the remain-
ing fetuses, and not solely for the purpose of selection. The in-
clusion of the word “solely” in the text of the North Dakota law 
and the proposed Missouri law would limit the laws’ applica-
tion in this scenario, because the physician would not be per-
forming the reduction in the first place were it not for the 
health of the woman and her pregnancy. Thus, even though 
North Dakota law explicitly bans selective reduction based on 
genetic abnormality, such a selective reduction would be per-
missible in cases of high-order multiples. 
 
 164. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 165. Mo. H.B. 439. 
 166. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015 (2015) (defining “[a]bortion” as “[t]he act 
of using or prescribing any . . . means or substance with the intent to destroy 
the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother’s womb,” or “[t]he intention-
al termination of the pregnancy of a mother by using or prescribing any . . . 
means or substance with an intention other than to increase the probability of 
a live birth or to remove a dead or dying unborn child”). Although selective re-
duction would fit within the exception that increases the probability of a live 
birth, it would be prohibited by the first provision. 
 167. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
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3. Selection for Sex 
There are a number of scenarios in which a pregnant wom-
an undergoing selective reduction may desire sex selection. For 
example, consider a woman who has undergone IVF and be-
come pregnant with quadruplets. Three of the fetuses are male, 
one is female, and all four are healthy. The woman already has 
two sons and has a strong desire for a daughter. Her physician 
strongly recommends a selective reduction from quadruplets to 
twins or a singleton, and the female fetus is the closest to the 
abdominal wall. Is the physician legally permitted to ask the 
woman of her preferences? If the physician knows the woman’s 
preference for a daughter, could the physician be prohibited 
from reducing one of the male fetuses that is more distant from 
the abdominal wall instead of the female? 
Under the Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and North 
Dakota motivation-based abortion prohibitions, this scenario 
would be permissible provided that the ultimate purpose of the 
reduction was to preserve the health of the mother and the re-
maining fetuses and not solely to select for sex. The inclusion of 
the word “solely” in the text of these statutes would limit the 
laws’ application in this scenario, because the physician would 
not be performing the reduction in the first place were it not for 
the health of the woman and her pregnancy. Under Arizona’s 
motivation-based abortion law, however, this procedure may 
not be permitted, because the law prohibits such a procedure if 
the sex of the fetus plays any role in the decision.168 Assuming 
that selective reduction would be classified as an abortion un-
der Arizona law, a prosecutor would merely have to show that 
the physician knew that the sex of the fetuses played a role in 
the woman’s decision of which ones to terminate. To avoid lia-
bility, the physician in such a scenario would have to decide 
which fetus to terminate based solely on a random characteris-
tic—the most logical characteristic being proximity to the ab-
dominal wall.169 
A more nuanced interpretation of Arizona law makes the 
outcome less clear in this context in several ways. First, Arizo-
na’s definition of abortion does not anticipate multifetal preg-
nancies or the need for selective reduction.170 Second, even if the 
law applies equally in all cases, a literal reading of the statute 
should not allow the law to govern the choice of which fetus to 
 
 168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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terminate in most selective reductions. In construing a statute, 
courts first consider “whether the language at issue has a plain 
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dis-
pute in the case.”171 The Arizona statute covers anyone who 
“[p]erforms an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought 
based on the sex . . . of the child . . . .”172 Because the law does 
not anticipate a multifetal pregnancy, it appears the law is 
written only to prevent sex selection in the decision of whether 
to terminate, rather than which fetus to terminate. 
While the term “abortion,” as discussed above, is subject to 
multiple interpretations, the remaining language of the statute 
is unambiguous. The requirement that an abortion be “sought 
based on” the sex of the fetus has a plain and unambiguous 
meaning: if a woman learns the sex of the fetus and subse-
quently decides to have an abortion based on that knowledge, 
then her decision falls within the meaning of the statute. For 
example, if a woman pregnant with twins, one male and one 
female, opts for a selective reduction because she wants only 
daughters and the twin pregnancy otherwise poses no major 
health risks, her physician would probably not be permitted to 
perform the procedure. In such a case, the woman opts for a se-
lective reduction because of the sex of the male fetus, whereas if 
both fetuses had been female, she would have carried the full 
pregnancy with both twins to term. Conversely, a woman’s de-
cision to seek an abortion prior to identifying the sex of the fe-
tus does not fall within the meaning of the statute. In a scenar-
io involving high-order multiples, for example, it is more likely 
that the woman has already decided to terminate one or more 
fetuses. Thus, she has sought a selective reduction for the sake 
of her health and the safety of the remaining fetuses, and even 
if she chooses which fetus to terminate based on its sex, she has 
not sought the reduction based on that characteristic.  
Third, the application of Arizona’s law to selective reduc-
tion can be challenged by a purpose-based approach to statuto-
ry interpretation. Such an interpretation suggests that Arizo-
na’s law should not apply in the above scenario. The purpose of 
Arizona’s motivation-based abortion prohibition is “to protect 
unborn children from prenatal discrimination in the form of be-
ing subjected to abortion based on the child’s sex or race.”173 
This purpose is based on the perception that such abortions do 
in fact occur and that they “are elective procedures that do not 
 
 171. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 172. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 173. 2011 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 9 (H.B. 2443) (West). 
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in any way implicate a woman’s health.”174 The choice of which 
fetus to reduce in a selective reduction procedure does not re-
flect this purpose. First, selective reductions are performed 
with the object of reducing or eliminating significant risks to 
both the remaining fetuses and the mother,175 and thus they are 
not merely “elective procedures” that have no effect on the 
woman’s health. Second, denying a pregnant woman the option 
to choose which fetus to terminate in a selective reduction does 
not necessarily resolve prenatal discrimination. Not all physi-
cians offer their patients the option to select for sex in a selec-
tive reduction, and not all patients have the desire to exercise 
that choice.176 Given the little evidence of disproportionate dis-
crimination against a particular gender in selective reduc-
tion,177 it follows that selective reduction is less of a vehicle for 
prenatal discrimination than an unfortunate necessity for 
women who must avoid the high risks of carrying multiples. 
The above analysis suggests that the current regulatory 
framework for abortion cannot be usefully applied in the con-
text of selective reduction. First, it is not entirely clear whether 
most motivation-based abortion prohibitions would apply to se-
lective reduction procedures, and there are valid arguments 
that they should not. Second, this ambiguity could have a 
chilling effect on providers who would otherwise recommend se-
lective reduction. Third, allowing motivation-based abortion 
prohibitions to regulate selective reduction would not have any 
meaningful effect on the social problems that such laws pur-
portedly aim to solve. Considering the growing number of moti-
vation-based abortion prohibitions, the high numbers of multi-
ple pregnancies, and the increasing recognition of risks 
associated even with twins, a different legal framework for reg-
ulating selective reduction is warranted. 
III.  LOOKING FORWARD: A VIABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2. 
 176. E.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (noting that some patients “want no 
part in the decision”). The decision to have a selective reduction can be emo-
tionally painful and psychologically scarring in its own right without the add-
ed burden of choosing one fetus over the other. See Lee, supra note 103. 
 177. First, considering the procedure’s recent development, selective reduc-
tion is less common than abortion to begin with. See Evans, supra note 6 (not-
ing that as of 2009, Evans was only “one of a small cadre of experienced, high-
risk obstetricians who now offer selective reduction”). Furthermore, there is 
evidence that among women who do choose selective reduction, some may elect 
to choose the sex of the remaining fetus, while many others do not wish to 
have any part in the decision. See supra note 176. 
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FOR SELECTIVE REDUCTION   
Selective reduction requires a legal framework that sepa-
rates the procedure from abortion, allows the ART industry to 
continue refining its practices, and serves legitimate state in-
terests without unnecessary state intervention in medical deci-
sions. There is no bright-line rule indicating when the risk of 
carrying a multifetal pregnancy to term becomes so high that 
selective reduction is “necessary” to save the life of the mother 
or preserve the pregnancy, and such bright-line rules would 
make little sense from a health or policy perspective.178 Allow-
ing states to impose broad limits on selective reduction—for ex-
ample, making selective reduction permissible where necessary 
to preserve the life or health of the mother and/or the remain-
ing fetuses—would require physicians to draw these arbitrary 
lines. Therefore, this Note proposes a solution that attempts to 
balance the interests of ART patients and the ART industry 
with state interests. 
Section A proposes that states should enact or amend their 
laws to ensure the legal separation of selective reduction from 
abortion. Then, Section B proposes that regulatory measures 
intended to reduce the need for selective reduction and prevent 
abuse of the procedure should for the most part be left to the 
medical community. If selective reduction were determined to 
be within the ambit of state abortion laws, the above analysis 
regarding motivation-based abortion prohibitions suggests that 
it may be permissible for states to mandate that selection be 
based on random placement. Section C, however, proposes that 
because mandating random selection would do little to resolve 
state legislatures’ concerns regarding discrimination, states 
should be able to impose such a mandate in very limited cir-
cumstances. 
 
A. STATES SHOULD LEGALLY DISTINGUISH SELECTIVE  
REDUCTION FROM ABORTION  
In most states, statutory language leaves it unclear wheth-
er state abortion laws would encompass selective reductions.179 
Because of the inherent differences between selective reduction 
and abortion,180 current abortion laws should not be interpreted 
 
 178. See Evans et al., supra note 147, at 105–08 (discussing the benefits as 
well as the ethical dilemmas of reducing twin pregnancies that make such 
line-drawing impractical). 
 179. See supra Part II.B. 
 180. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
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to encompass selective reduction.181 Whereas motivation-based 
abortion prohibitions anticipate the termination of a pregnancy 
because of an inherent characteristic of the fetus (such as sex 
or genetic abnormality), selection in the context of selective re-
duction is a necessity—the physician must either choose which 
fetus to reduce based on a random characteristic (i.e., proximity 
to the abdominal wall) or offer the choice to the patient, who 
must choose which fetus to keep based on whatever character-
istics can be identified. In selective reduction, the choice gener-
ally arises out of medical necessity, whereas in the types of 
abortions anticipated by motivation-based abortion prohibi-
tions, the choice typically arises out of preference alone.182 
From a policy perspective, allowing these laws to limit a 
pregnant woman’s choices when undergoing a selective reduc-
tion would do little to resolve the issues of discrimination iden-
tified by proponents of such prohibitions. The purpose of selec-
tive reduction is to diminish the risks posed by high-order 
multiple pregnancies,183 rather than to offer parents a “menu” 
from which they can choose the fetus with the most desirable 
genetic qualities—and there is little evidence that pregnant 
women and physicians are abusing IVF and selective reduction 
in this way.184 Furthermore, the medical community already 
generally condemns the practice of sex selection.185 It is also un-
clear that prohibiting abortions based on genetic abnormality 
would actually resolve discrimination against those who carry 
those abnormalities, since a woman living in a state with such 
a prohibition can travel to another state to terminate her preg-
 
 181. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 783 (“A woman undergoing 
a ‘traditional’ abortion intends that her entire pregnancy will be terminated: 
that following successful completion of the procedure she will no longer be 
pregnant. In contrast, a woman undergoing selective reduction intends that 
her pregnancy will not be terminated, but rather will be enhanced by creating 
a better environment for her fetus(es) to develop. The difference in intent so 
separates [selective reduction and abortion] as to render them wholly distin-
guishable. This distinction should be maintained in the policy-making and po-
litical arenas that swirl around the abortion issue.”). 
 182. See supra note 104–107 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Committee Opinion No. 360, supra note 23, at 478 (explaining that 
while the ACOG accepts sex selection to prevent sex-linked genetic disorders, 
it opposes sex selection for other reasons, including discriminatory beliefs and 
“family balancing”). The ACOG also acknowledges, however, that patients are 
entitled to information including the sex of the fetus, and therefore “it will 
sometimes be impossible for health care professionals to avoid unwitting par-
ticipation in sex selection.” Id. 
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nancy.186 Given the purposes of selective reduction, however, 
even if prohibiting abortions based on genetic abnormality 
would have an anti-discriminatory effect, it is not likely that 
such a prohibition would have the same effect in the context of 
selective reduction, because the decision to reduce in the first 
instance is most often made based on the risks posed by the 
pregnancy rather than the characteristics of the fetus. Because 
motivation-based abortion prohibitions would do little to re-
solve discrimination if applied to selective reduction, there is 
little value in allowing such laws to apply to selective reduc-
tion. 
For the sake of providing clarity, particularly for physi-
cians, states should amend their abortion laws to explicitly ex-
clude selective reduction from the definition of abortion. Such a 
provision might read, “Nothing in this Chapter shall be con-
strued to limit the selective reduction of a multifetal pregnancy 
where a physician has determined that selective reduction is in 
the best interest of the health of the mother and the remaining 
fetus or fetuses.” Such a provision would provide needed clari-
ty, especially in states that have enacted motivation-based 
abortion prohibitions. As physicians continue to refine selective 
reduction procedures and demonstrate higher success rates, 
particularly for women who want to reduce twins to singletons, 
this practice will become more prevalent and accessible. Allow-
ing selective reductions to fall within the ambit of motivation-
based abortion prohibitions could produce a chilling effect on 
those providers in states with the most restrictive laws, given 
the high costs of violating such laws. Such a chilling effect 
could result in fewer providers offering selective reduction ser-
vices, adding extensive travel costs to the already immensely 
expensive IVF process for women who may have to seek out 
providers in other states. Although the total number of physi-
cians that provide selective reductions still remains relatively 
low, meaning that many women already have to travel to find a 
 
 186. See Alison Piepmeier, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with 
Down Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES: MOTHERLODE (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:05 PM), http:// 
parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/outlawing-abortion-wont-help 
-children-with-down-syndrome (arguing that North Dakota’s new abortion law 
would not stop women from terminating their pregnancies but instead would 
make “an incredibly difficult process even more difficult for them”). But see 
Mark Leach, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with Down Syndrome? 
History Might Suggest Otherwise, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Apr. 
2, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/outlawing-abortion 
-wont-help-children-with-down-syndrome-history-might-suggests-otherwise 
(noting that “the termination rate [where abortion is outlawed] is still lower 
than in countries permitting selective abortion”). 
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provider, the need for travel is likely to diminish as the proce-
dure becomes more prevalent and accessible.187 
It is unclear whether states would opt for this route. The 
existence of the provision in North Dakota’s law stating that 
abortion includes “the elimination of one or more unborn chil-
dren in a multifetal pregnancy”188 suggests that some state leg-
islatures may actually lean in the opposite direction. However, 
given the continued prevalence of multiples resulting from IVF 
and the risks associated with multiple pregnancies, it is urgent 
that these state legislatures reconsider the effects that laws 
limiting selective reduction might have on women’s health and 
the ability of the ART industry to provide healthy pregnancies. 
B. STATES SHOULD CONSIDER REGULATORY MEASURES AIMED  
AT ENCOURAGING CERTAIN PRACTICES IN THE ASSISTED  
REPRODUCTION INDUSTRY 
While the ideal solution to the ethical problems contem-
plated by this Note may be to reduce the need for selective re-
duction to begin with, it is not clear that most plausible regula-
tions in the ART industry would actually have this effect. The 
assisted reproduction industry has made strides toward reduc-
ing the occurrence of high-order multiples in the context of 
IVF,189 but SART reports show that industry self-regulation 
limiting embryo transfers has not yet led to a significant reduc-
tion in the occurrence of twins.190 This discrepancy is most like-
ly the result of hesitance within the industry to implement a 
policy of single embryo transfer. Many doctors will recommend 
transferring no more than one embryo at a time to avoid the 
risk of multiples, but they are also responsive to the needs and 
desires of patients who exert pressure to transfer multiple em-
 
 187. This Note acknowledges that it is not a certainty that the practice of 
selective reduction will become significantly more prevalent, especially if in-
dustry regulation succeeds in curtailing the number of high-order multiples in 
IVF pregnancies. However, considering the present lack of success in reducing 
the occurrences of twins, as well as physicians’ increased recognition of the 
risks inherent in twin pregnancies, it is likely that selective reduction will con-
tinue to progress. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; infra note 199. 
 188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013). 
 189. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Clinic Summary Report, supra note 94 (showing that for IVF 
pregnancies in women under 35, twin births decreased from 33.5% in 2003 to 
28.3% in 2013, while the occurrence of triplets or more decreased from 6.4% in 
2003 to 0.9% in 2013, a much more significant change); see also supra note 95 
and accompanying text. 
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bryos at once to increase the chances of obtaining a pregnancy 
and bypass the need to go through multiple costly IVF cycles.191 
The most significant obstacle to effectively regulating se-
lective reduction by limiting embryo transfers is the cost of 
IVF. Were the government to adopt, for example, legislation 
mandating a policy of no more than single embryo transfers, it 
would risk putting desperate patients in the position of having 
to spend two to three times more to obtain a pregnancy.192 As 
physician and scholar Mark Evans argues: 
[A]dopting a program of single embryo transfer in the U.S. won’t work 
because the cost of [IVF] is too expensive. At about $15,000, most 
couples are willing to accept the possibility of complications and have 
a pregnancy versus none at all. In Australia, where the out-of-pocket 
cost for I.V.F. is about $400 per cycle, there is relatively little pres-
sure to transfer more than one embryo. Until we get a handle on 
health care costs, we will continue to see multiple births.193 
Thus, while the government may feasibly impose a single 
embryo transfer limit, such a regulation would most likely only 
be effective if the government also subsidized IVF.194 Others 
have advocated a policy of promoting single embryo transfers 
from within the industry.195 Such a policy might include re-
minding legislators and insurance companies of the benefits of 
reducing multiple pregnancies; encouraging insurance compa-
nies to pay the relatively small costs for IVF (as opposed to the 
much higher costs of high-risk pregnancy); and modifying the 
national reporting system to disincentivize multiple pregnancy 
as a measurement IVF success, which could be accomplished by 
ceasing to count triplets or higher order multiples as a “success-
 
 191. See Robert Stillman, Response to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. 
TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births (“In our non-single pay-
er health care system and in our national cultural context (with its paramount 
legacy of individual rights over those of the state), patient autonomy will al-
most always prevail.”). 
 192. See Mark I. Evans, Response to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y. 
TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Judith Daar, Federalizing Embryo Transfers: Taming the Wild 
West of Reproductive Medicine?, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 257, 321 (2012) 
(“While a standalone federal law can impose embryo transfer limits, the suc-
cess of any such regime hinges on the compliance patients and physicians are 
willing to provide. Changing patient and physician behavior in the surgical 
suite will start by neutralizing or reducing the cost each must bear in order to 
attain their desired results. A federal mandate to cover or subsidize the cost of 
infertility care, as a companion to embryo transfer restrictions, should provide 
the necessary incentive for adherence.”). 
 195. See Stillman, supra note 191. 
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ful cycle” and increasing the evaluative weight assigned to 
births resulting from single embryo transfers.196 Given the im-
practicability of a legally mandated single embryo transfer pol-
icy, implementing such policies might be the most effective 
measure for reducing the need for selective reduction. However, 
such policies need not be implemented at the industry level 
alone. Federal and state laws imposing reporting requirements 
already exist,197 and such laws may be modified with provisions 
such as those suggested above to better promote a single em-
bryo transfer policy within the ART industry. 
Thus, while state legislatures should refrain from enacting 
laws to regulate the embryo transfer stage of IVF as long as the 
costs of IVF remain high, those with an interest in reducing 
multiple pregnancies and thus the need for selective reduction 
should enact, or review and modify, laws that impose reporting 
requirements and amend them to better promote a single em-
bryo transfer policy without legally mandating it. States may 
not be able to eliminate the need for selective reduction, but 
those with an interest in eliminating perceived discrimination 
through selective reduction may still be able to permissibly en-
act separate laws dealing specifically with selective reduction. 
C. STATES SHOULD ONLY MANDATE RANDOM SELECTION IN  
TWIN-TO-SINGLETON REDUCTIONS, EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE  
GENETIC ABNORMALITIES ARE IDENTIFIED 
While this Note contends that selective reduction should be 
legally separate from abortion, it also acknowledges that some 
regulation of selective reduction may be permissible under the 
same principles that permit the regulation of abortion. It is 
possible that these principles would permit the regulation of 
the selection process in selective reduction. As a general policy 
matter, states should not intervene in the doctor-patient deci-
sion of whether to opt for a selective reduction. However, there 
are some cases in which regulation might be permissible. This 
Note contends that while it may be permissible for states to 
mandate random selection in some cases where sex is the only 
distinguishing factor, states should not be able to mandate 
random selection where a genetic abnormality exists. 
If narrow limitations on motivation-based abortions are 
otherwise constitutionally permissible, then states might also 
be able to impose similar narrow limits in the selective reduc-
 
 196. Id. 
 197. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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tion context. Given the questionable constitutionality of moti-
vation-based abortion prohibitions to begin with,198 the most 
prudent approach might be to impose the narrowest ban possi-
ble. For example, it is possible that states could prohibit selec-
tion at the point where selective reduction toes the line be-
tween being a necessary procedure and being an elective one—
the selective reduction of twins to a singleton.199 To the extent 
that selective reduction resembles abortion, state legislatures 
should consider guidelines similar to those articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Roe and Casey in drafting laws regulating 
selective reduction.200 While this Note argues that states should 
take steps to completely eliminate selective reduction from the 
scope of abortion laws,201 states could enact other laws under a 
different rubric to deal specifically with the issue of impermis-
sible bases for selection in the context of selective reduction.202 
Such laws might limit patients’ choices by mandating that, 
in a twin-to-singleton reduction, the selection of which fetus to 
reduce be random. This limitation would ensure that, at least 
in twin reduction cases, the decision to seek a reduction is not 
motivated solely by the desire to have a child of one sex over 
the other. A woman motivated by such a desire would not opt 
for a selective reduction in the first place, knowing that she 
would not be able to select for the sex of her choice. Such a pro-
vision would serve the purpose of state legislatures in enacting 
motivation-based abortion prohibitions, if the true goal of such 
prohibitions is to eliminate gender discrimination. The practi-
 
 198. See supra Part II.A. 
 199. The idea that selective reduction of twins resulting from IVF is elec-
tive rather than necessary may be controversial, as doctors are increasingly 
recognizing the risks of twin pregnancies. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 192 
(“Identical twins are more prone to miscarriage; premature birth; structural 
abnormalities of the brain, spine and heart; and have a 10 percent to 15 per-
cent risk of the twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome where the fetuses fight over 
the shared blood supply, and fundamentally they both lose. The mother has 
higher risks of toxemia and a plethora of other complications including mortal-
ity. Although difficult for many to accept, if one defines success as a healthy 
mother and healthy family, there is no question that it is safer for a woman 
with twins to opt for reduction and give birth to only one child.”). 
 200. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra Part III.A. 
 202. The interests of the states in regulating medical procedures are well-
established, so such regulation would not be entirely unique. See Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (“There can be no doubt the government 
‘has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profes-
sion.’ Under our precedents it is clear the State has a significant role to play in 
regulating the medical profession.” (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997))). 
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cal effect would be that in the consultation phase, physicians 
would inform their patients that should they opt for a selective 
reduction, the physician will select the fetus closest to the ab-
dominal wall and that no other characteristics may be consid-
ered.203 
The validity of such a law would present many more com-
plex issues in the context of a selective reduction based on a 
genetic abnormality of the fetus. With respect to the issue of 
genetic abnormality, while states may have a strong interest in 
eliminating disability discrimination, explicitly prohibiting the 
selective reduction of fetuses with genetic abnormalities may 
lead to unjust results. Consider a woman who goes through IVF 
and becomes pregnant with twins. Her physician performs a 
screen and informs her that one of the fetuses carries a genetic 
abnormality that is likely Down syndrome. If her state could 
prohibit the selective reduction of a fetus on the basis of genetic 
abnormality, her physician would not be able to perform the 
procedure without running afoul of state law, even though the 
physician would ordinarily advise it. 
The practical effects of the state’s law could produce a 
number of complex moral issues. For example, if the woman in 
this scenario were unable to travel outside the state to obtain a 
selective reduction, the law would effectively force her to bear 
and raise a child with a genetic abnormality. Furthermore, 
many women choose to terminate pregnancies in which the fe-
tus carries a known abnormality not because of the added fi-
nancial or emotional costs of raising the child, but as a “protec-
tive measure” based on their own sense of morality and 
justice.204 While a full analysis of the constitutionality of this 
result is outside its scope, this Note concludes that states 
should not enact laws that could potentially lead to the consti-
tutionally questionable results of infringing on procreative lib-
erty and imposing significant financial, medical, and emotional 
burdens on the mother. 
 
 203. Generally, this would be with the exception of genetic abnormalities, 
which the doctor would ordinarily screen for beforehand. See, e.g., Evans, su-
pra note 6. 
 204. See Piepmeier, supra note 186 (noting that in interviewing several 
women who chose to terminate their pregnancies when they learned that the 
fetus had Down syndrome, it was not because they wanted a “perfect child,” 
but because they feared the problems that their children would face as adults, 
including a heightened risk of sexual abuse). 
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  CONCLUSION   
Assisted reproductive technology has brought tremendous 
joy into the lives of many hopeful parents, yet this advanced 
technology can also lead to devastatingly difficult choices. For 
many fertility patients, the joy of finally becoming pregnant 
will be tempered by the difficult choice of which fetus or fetuses 
to keep in order to ensure a healthy pregnancy. Many patients, 
to relieve the ethical and emotional burden of such a difficult 
decision, would have their physicians choose which fetus to re-
duce at random. Others, however, may wish to have the option 
to choose the sex of their child. More commonly, those carrying 
one or more fetuses with a genetic abnormality may wish to 
make their decision based on that knowledge. 
Recently enacted state legislation may impose limits on 
these choices. The number of states adopting or proposing mo-
tivation-based abortion prohibitions is growing rapidly. Inter-
preted literally, it is not certain that such statutes would en-
compass selective reduction, but there is a strong argument 
that they could. While there is also a strong argument that the-
se laws may be unconstitutional, unless and until their consti-
tutionality is decided, they will continue to apply to motivation-
based abortions and may even apply to selective reductions. 
Furthermore, even if these laws are found to be unconstitu-
tional, it is likely that state legislatures will modify them to 
comply with constitutional requirements. In the meantime, an 
increasing number of state legislatures are proposing or enact-
ing motivation-based abortion prohibitions. The mere presence 
of these laws could easily produce a chilling effect on providers, 
particularly where state law explicitly includes selective reduc-
tion within the definition of abortion. 
Given the important technical and ethical distinctions be-
tween abortion and selective reduction and the low likelihood 
that allowing choices in selective reduction will lead to discrim-
inatory results, motivation-based abortion prohibitions should 
not be applied in the context of selective reduction. Rather, 
states that wish to limit patients’ choices in the selective reduc-
tion context should consider revising reporting requirements in 
the assisted reproduction industry in order to encourage poli-
cies that lead to a decline in the number of multifetal pregnan-
cies and the need for selective reduction. If states wish to elim-
inate the possibility of discrimination in selective reduction, 
they should refrain from adopting anything more than a very 
narrow limitation on selection for sex in the reduction of twins 
to a singleton. Anything more would unnecessarily burden both 
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providers and patients in the process of ensuring healthy preg-
nancies for patients in need. 
 
